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Critical Dialogues

Critical Dialogue
Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law. By
Bruce P. Frohnen and George W. Carey. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016. 304p. $45.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S153759271700370X

— James E. Fleming, Boston University

It is a privilege to participate in this exchange with Bruce
Frohnen concerning our books. In my Fidelity to Our
Imperfect Constitution, I observe that in recent years, many
have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on
concern for ﬁdelity in constitutional interpretation. I
reject all forms of originalism and defend a moral reading
of the United States Constitution. Such a conception
views the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and
political principles, not codifying concrete historical rules
or practices. It sees interpretation of those principles as
requiring normative judgments about how they are best
understood, not merely historical research to discover
relatively speciﬁc original meanings. I argue that ﬁdelity
in interpreting the Constitution requires a moral reading.
Fidelity commits us to honoring the aspirational principles
embodied in our constitutional text and practice, not
merely following the relatively speciﬁc original meanings
of the Founders. Only a moral reading that aspires to
interpret our imperfect Constitution so as to make it the
best it can be gives us hope of interpreting it in a manner
that may deserve our ﬁdelity.
In Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law,
Frohnen and Carey argue that separation of powers
among coequal branches of government formed the
cornerstone of our original constitutional morality. But
“Progressives” attacked this bedrock principle, believing
that it impeded government from “doing the people’s
business” (p. 8). The regime of mixed powers, delegation,
and expansive legal interpretation that they instituted
rejected the ideals of limited government embodied in the
Constitution. Instead, Progressives promoted a governmental model rooted in French revolutionary claims.
They replaced a Constitution designed to mediate among
society’s different groups with a body of quasi laws
commanding the democratic reformation of society.
Pursuit of this Progressive vision, they argue, has become
ingrained in our legal and political culture, thereby
undermining the constitutional safeguards that preserve
the rule of law.
© American Political Science Association 2018

What are the justiﬁcations for pairing these two books?
For one thing, they illustrate the radical divide between
liberal and conservative constitutional theory. For another, even where they might seem to stand on common
ground (consider my arguments for a moral reading and
Frohnen and Carey’s emphasis on constitutional morality,
and both of our concerns for the virtues essential for
ordered liberty), closer examination shows that we understand these concepts radically differently. I sketch our
differences by focusing on the issues framed in my title.
1. Fidelity: I distinguish two understandings of ﬁdelity
in constitutional interpretation: a) ﬁdelity as following
relatively speciﬁc original meanings (originalisms) versus
b) ﬁdelity as honoring aspirational principles embodied in
the constitutional text and practice (moral readings).
I argue for the latter.
Frohnen and Carey do not explicitly present themselves as originalists nor do they advance a conception of
ﬁdelity as such. They argue that to realize the beneﬁts of
the rule of law, we must follow the original constitutional
design as they conceive it. They presumably would argue
that what I conceive as ﬁdelity is instead inﬁdelity of the
highest order. In their terms, it amounts to a French
Revolution overthrowing our original “mediating” constitution and replacing it with a “commanding” constitution (pp. 14, 77–78).
The Constitution is hardly commanding, although it is
aspirational. The Constitution proclaims itself to be an
instrument aspiring to form a “more perfect union” and to
pursue the noble ends stated in the Preamble. Similarly,
the Reconstruction Amendments promise a “new birth of
freedom” together with the status of equal citizenship for
all. If we are to be faithful to our imperfect, aspirational
Constitution, we should interpret it so as to make it the
best it can be. Frohnen and Carey evidently see separation
of powers, the rule of law, federalism, and the nature of our
mediating constitution as protecting us against the very
things I see the Constitution as aspiring to. Yet following
relatively speciﬁc original meanings would enshrine an
imperfect Constitution that does not deserve our ﬁdelity.
2. Our Imperfect Constitution: Jack Balkin (Living
Originalism, 2011) contrasts two types of originalism.
“Skyscraper originalism” views the Constitution as more
or less a ﬁnished product, subject to later Article V
amendment. “Framework originalism” views the
March 2018 | Vol. 16/No. 1
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Constitution as a framework for governance that must be
ﬁlled out over time through constitutional construction.
Later generations have to build up and implement the
Constitution, but they must remain faithful to the basic
framework (pp. 21–23). This contrast parallels a basic
difference between our books. Frohnen and Carey view
the Constitution as more or less a ﬁnished product,
whereas I view it as a framework for governance that we
have to build out over time in order to address future
problems and to realize the best understanding of our
constitutional commitments.
Accordingly, the books reﬂect different starting points
and attitudes toward change. I begin where we are today
in an ongoing constitutional practice and seek to construct the theory that best ﬁts and justiﬁes that practice.
They begin with a conception of the original constitutional design and criticize practices they see as departing
from it. I presume that we have built out our framework
for governance in a spirit of ﬁdelity to our aspirational
Constitution, and that where we have departed from
practices speciﬁcally contemplated by the Founders, we
have done so because they have proven to be inadequate
to fulﬁll the Constitution’s aspirations. They presume that
Progressives who reject the original Constitution have
sought to replace it with a different constitution that
cannot preserve the rule of law.
3. For Moral Readings: I argue for a moral reading of
the Constitution. They emphasize a constitutional morality undergirding the Constitution. Judging from
these formulations, we might expect to ﬁnd common
ground. Yet I conceive a moral reading as a theory of
constitutional interpretation and a substantive theory
that best ﬁts and justiﬁes our constitutional text and
practice. They conceive constitutional morality in terms
of the self-restraint of ofﬁcers to honor separation of
powers, the rule of law, and federalism and therewith to
secure ordered liberty. This morality is in part the virtue
of ofﬁcers who refrain from undertaking the aspirational
projects my theory prescribes. Strikingly, constitutional
morality on their view would preclude the very pursuit
of a moral reading!
Both books reﬂect conceptions of the virtues necessary
to sustain our constitutional order and to secure ordered
liberty. In fact, I coauthored a book entitled Ordered
Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues (2013; with
Linda C. McClain). But there is a wide gulf between our
views. For them, those virtues are inculcated almost
entirely through the institutions of civil society. They
reject what I propose: a formative project of government
and civil society working together to inculcate civic virtues
and to develop the capacities for responsible selfgovernment. I conceive government as compensating or
correcting for the failures of civil society in order to secure
ordered liberty. They see government as usurping the role
of civil society and encroaching on ordered liberty.
184
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4. Against Originalisms: I argue against originalism in
part on the ground that it cannot ﬁt and justify our
constitutional practice, which largely has rejected it.
Indeed, I observe that originalism is characteristically a call
for a radical return to ﬁrst principles. Nonetheless,
conservative legal originalists typically start from where
we are today: a) living in a modern administrative state
with practices not envisioned by the Founders and
b) living in a constitutional order with doctrines built
out through a process of common law constitutional
interpretation. Because of the “ghost of Lochner,” most
originalists have largely accepted the legitimacy of the New
Deal and the modern administrative state. Moreover, most
accept, as settled law, doctrines that they are not able to
square with relatively speciﬁc original meanings.
Frohnen and Carey are more radical in the sense of
rejecting as illegitimate many practices and doctrines they
believe are incompatible with the original constitutional
design. Their attack on Progressivism entails that most of
the New Deal and the modern administrative state is
unconstitutional. Ironically, given that they evidently
view themselves as Burkeans, they are more revolutionary
than typical originalists because they contemplate a radical
return to ﬁrst principles and rejection of long-standing,
deeply ingrained practices.
When I wrote Fidelity, I knew that the divide between
liberal and conservative constitutional theory was profound. After reading Frohnen and Carey’s book, I have
concluded that it is wider and deeper than I could have
imagined. We hold fundamentally different presuppositions about the attitudes of actors within our constitutional scheme. I presume that liberals are committed to
building out the best understanding of our constitutional
commitments, whereas they presume that liberals reject
the original constitutional design and seek to replace it
with a Progressive design that undermines the separation
of powers, the rule of law, federalism, and therewith
ordered liberty. I presume that when our constitutional
practice does not conform to putative original constitutional design, it is because experience has shown that it is
inadequate for pursuing the aspirations proclaimed in the
Preamble. I presume, in short, an attitude of ﬁdelity to our
imperfect Constitution.
Response to James E. Fleming’s review of
Constitutional Morality and the Rise of Quasi-Law
doi:10.1017/S1537592717003711

— Bruce Frohnen

Are the American people to be ruled by laws of their own
devising or according to the prejudices of a small group of
lawyers and politicians who have abandoned the hard
work dictated by their vocation? This is only one of the
questions addressed by Constitutional Morality and the Rise

of Quasi-Law that is ignored in James Fleming’s initial
contribution to this dialogue. Others include: What is law?
What is the rule of law, and why ought we to value it?
What is a constitution, and what role(s) might it play in
upholding the rule of law? Is justice achievable through
law? And, most comprehensively: What happens when
a people’s expectations from their government increase to
the point where that government can no longer function
according to the rules and restrictions laid down in law?
Fleming makes clear his indifference to such questions
when discussing his own work: “I begin where we are
today in an ongoing constitutional practice and seek to
construct the theory that best ﬁts and justiﬁes that
practice.” That is, he takes judicial activism as selfjustifying and seeks to buttress it as necessary for its
perpetuation. His theory is a tool, a means by which to
justify continuing currently popular conduct.
Why ought Fleming, and those who share his vision,
continue their current conduct, and why ought citizens of
the American republic acquiesce in such continuation?
His evidence for the claim that his conduct is justiﬁed
because the Constitution is “a framework or charter of
abstract aspirational principles” (p. 10) consists of vague
references to the Preamble and Civil War Amendments.
He barely makes the effort of asserting this justiﬁcation,
and it is barely worth refuting. What Fleming adds is
presumption. Here I refer to this statement: “I presume
that we have built out our framework for governance in
a spirit of ﬁdelity to our aspirational Constitution, and that
where we have departed from practices speciﬁcally contemplated by the Founders, we have done so because they
have proven to be inadequate to fulﬁll the Constitution’s
aspirations.” Such presumptions are convenient, but
hardly self-evident. Moreover, his assertion that George
Carey and I simply “presume” otherwise constitutes
a ﬂagrant dismissal of the evidence as well as the arguments
of our book.
The core of what Fleming ignores in Constitutional
Morality is its understanding of the vocation of lawyers and
statesmen. He may feel free to “philosophize” in the partial
sense of justifying his own practices and political preferences. But until quite recently, lawyers were trained
otherwise and, given law’s historical nature and role, the
people clearly have a right to expect more from them. The
historical and linguistic work Fleming dismisses as worthy
only of “pygmies” is neither simple nor meaningless; it is
the essence of lawyering, and especially of judging—just as
determining legislative priorities and design is the essence
of being a legislator and executing the laws is the essence of
being a chief executive. When holding public ofﬁce, one’s
duty is to uphold the generally understood methods and
goals of that ofﬁce. Adjudicating under law requires
working to understand the law as it is and to vindicate
the reasonable expectations of the parties to any given legal
action. Making law requires writing legislation that sets

forth clear, consistent rules the people can follow. Executing laws requires enforcing the law as written. This is the
essence of the traditional American constitutional morality, a morality that once upheld the rule of law, not the rule
of would-be moral philosophers in black robes. When all
those in power decide that they are moral philosophers
entitled to redesign the rules that order our common life,
law is reduced to will—and a contradictory, unpredictable
will at that.
Virtue requires of those in power that they not abuse
it, that they act within the scope of authority given them
by higher authority—in the case of judges and lawyers, the
Constitution, and the law. It is ironic that Fleming would
so misdeﬁne the term “ﬁdelity” as to have it require his
“moral reading”—based in nothing more substantial than
a thin Rawlsian consensus—to gut the text of law, and the
Constitution’s higher law, in the name of reaching his
preferred political goals.
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral
Readings and Against Originalisms. By James E. Fleming.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 264p. $79.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592717003723

— Bruce P. Frohnen, Ohio Northern University

Methods of constitutional interpretation have multiplied
in recent decades. Self-conscious “living constitutionalism,” noninterpretivism, and other methods eschewing
direct reliance on the Constitution’s text have been overshadowed by common law constitutionalism, moral/
philosophical readings rooted in the work of Ronald
Dworkin, and a plethora of “originalisms” spanning the
distance from late Justice Antonin Scalia to postmodernist
Jack Balkin. In this book, James Fleming seeks to critique
and reinterpret these various methods and their assumptions. His goal is to reconcile most nonoriginalist methods
to his own Dworkin-inﬂuenced reading and in opposition
to any traditional, “authoritarian” form of originalism.
Of central concern to Fleming is originalism’s perceived occupation of the high ground of ﬁdelity to our
fundamental law and frame of government. His solution?
Lawyers and academics must reconceptualize ﬁdelity (and
that to which it is owed) so that they can defeat, in the
court of legal and academic opinion, “authoritarian”
originalism—that focus on text-based, original meanings
Fleming portrays as a backward-looking ideology upholding “racist, sexist, and heterosexist expectations and
presuppositions” (p. 63). According to the author, constitutional interpreters should instead engage in “a moral
reading or philosophic approach that conceives ﬁdelity as
honoring our commitments to abstract aspirational principles” (p. xi).
Part I of Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution outlines
recent attempts to “save” originalism by expanding its list
March 2018 | Vol. 16/No. 1
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of authoritative texts and interpreting constitutional
language at a higher level of abstraction. Fleming notes
that this loose originalism risks making all of us into
originalists, thereby jettisoning any value to the term. As to
more traditional (“authoritarian”) originalists such as John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, Fleming accuses them
of supporting regressive policies on the basis of a false, if
not bad faith, argument that constitutional terms enshrine
concrete historical meanings and precedents.
The second part is Fleming’s attempt to reclaim the
notion of “ﬁdelity” for nonoriginalists. He focuses especially on David Strauss’s “common law constitutionalism.”
The goal is to think “self-critically about the best that the
law could mean within the limits of the law’s language and
what the community will accept” (p. 80). Here, he
assumes that 1) “the best” is discernable by judges, and
2) “the best” should shape how the law is read, not
consensus, predictability, or perhaps the language of the
law itself.
Part III argues for a moral reading of “living” originalists like Jack Balkin and the living constitutionalism of
Bruce Ackerman, with its emphasis on progressive political
movements and “superprecedents.” In Part IV, Fleming
restates his espousal of moral readings as preserving and
perfecting the Constitution. He concludes by arguing that
only such a reading and program can save us from the
moral necessity of rejecting and replacing the Constitution.
Fleming’s ideal, morally interpreted Constitution
would: guarantee “positive beneﬁts” rather than merely
“negative liberties”; neuter the Electoral College; replace
constitutional neutrality with an “anti-caste principle” in
judging laws; create “an equal voice in the political
process,” through control of campaign spending; eliminate
limits on federal powers rooted in principles of federalism;
and further limit the right to bear arms. In the author’s
view, this list of favored progressive policies could be
achieved through constitutional interpretation without
going through the onerous procedures laid out in the
amendment process, thus justifying retention of the
Constitution itself (pp.182–84).
Fleming seeks to rework the Constitution, using it to
make America what he thinks it ought to be. His
constitutional interpretation would “afford everyone the
status of free and equal citizenship in our morally
pluralistic constitutional democracy,” even as that democracy would cultivate “the civil virtues” and foster “the
capacities for constitutional self-government” (pp. 175–
76). This is, then, a full, normative vision of what makes
for a good political society and life. The question is why we
should accept this vision as our own and encourage its
imposition on the nation through judicial decisions.
In making his case, Fleming asserts that the Constitution is “a framework or charter of abstract aspirational
principles” (p. 10). If true, such a claim would delegitimize
186
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originalism because “original methods concerning the
interpretation of text and intent, supplemented by original
interpretive rules, are not going to provide determinacy in
interpreting abstract constitutional commitments” (p. 57).
Are America’s constitutional commitments “abstract?”
Here, Fleming asserts the importance of the Constitution’s
Preamble, with its references to establishing justice and
promoting the general welfare. Yet the Preamble, from its
drafting up to the present day, has been recognized as an
enacting clause and statement of general purpose, not as
a Rosetta Stone of interpretive meaning, let alone a source
of rights or powers. Only a few relatively recent Supreme
Court justices have sought to make something more of the
Preamble, while defending progressive policy goals. It is to
such justices, including William Brennan and Anthony
Kennedy, that Fleming turns in making the wider claim
that, as Brennan wrote: “Interpretation must account for
the transformative purpose of the text. Our Constitution
was not intended to preserve a pre-existing society but to
make a new one, to put in place new principles that the
prior political community had not sufﬁciently recognized.” That is, the Constitution should be read as
a progressive document encouraging innovations aimed
at increased equality and individual autonomy because it
was intended to “make over their world” (p. 44).
The author seeks to imbue chosen progressive arguments and precedents with constitutional authority. But
he does not make any showing as to why readers should
accept twentieth- and twenty-ﬁrst-century claims of the
Constitution’s “transformative” character; in this vein, he
provides nothing beyond assertion, a few bits of judicial
dicta and legislative detritus, and his own political program. Such does not constitute a counter to the plethora of
contemporaneous statements and arguments justifying the
Constitution as a means of achieving the goal—both truly
revolutionary and intrinsically limited—of establishing, by
agreement, a stable, lasting republican government under
law. One obvious relevant example, here, is Federalist #9’s
argument that the Constitution’s structures would allow
the United States to avoid “the rapid succession of
revolutions” experienced by ancient Greek and Roman
republics.
In addition, Fleming makes no effort to show why his
own policy goals should be raised to the level of higher
law, sufﬁcient to outweigh the historical meaning of legal
terms and the right of the people to be ruled by settled,
known laws. Instead, he elides interpretive issues by
giving new meaning to phrases like “general welfare,”
and arguing for the centrality of concepts like “autonomy”
found nowhere in the Constitution’s text. One may
choose to applaud the rise of autonomy as a political
concept. But Fleming uses a far-fetched hypothetical to
present the sexual autonomy cases, dating back no further
than the middle of the twentieth century, as somehow
embedding in our Constitution legal terms on a par with

due process and equal protection (p. 38). In so doing, he
assumes the point at issue, namely, whether the Constitution provides abstract, malleable principles, or legal
terms freighted with practical as well as historical meaning.
It remains unclear what entitles judges to ignore the former
in favor of the latter, thereby denying litigants and citizens
in general their right to be ruled by settled, known rules.
The rhetorical strength of Fleming’s argument lies in
the clear injustice of the Constitution’s protection of
slavery and indifference to segregation. Why would we
bind ourselves to the understandings of those who would
protect such evil? Here, he simply dismisses the Constitution’s provision of two potentially reinforcing means
by which injustices might be abolished: legislative action
and formal amendment. That the Supreme Court has
further embedded injustices into our legal system through
its own arrogant and policy-driven misconstructions in
cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson,
should give Fleming pause in his rush to enshrine “superprecedents” whose policy outcomes he approves.
Nevertheless, Fleming argues that only a “Constitution-perfecting theory” that “exhorts judges, elected ofﬁcials, and citizens to reﬂect upon and deliberate about our
deepest principles and highest aspirations as a people” can
save us from the status of “pygmies” bowing down before
fatally ﬂawed ancestors (pp. 189, 191). His epistemological assumption? A judge must be capable of consistently
and coherently “thinking for yourself about what constitutional provisions seem to refer to—like equal protection
itself and due process itself ” (p. 75, emphasis in original).
Evidence offered up by Roger Taney, Henry Brown,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and their afﬁrming colleagues
suggests that Fleming assumes too much.
It would be a mistake to overlook the radical claim
inherent in Fleming’s vision. In thinking “philosophically” or “for yourself,” judges would eschew their
traditional vocation of applying the law. Reasoning by
analogy, according to established rules of grammar, and in
keeping with common law maxims is to be dismissed as
slavish and unjust. Instead, judges are to aim at comprehending, outside of history and usage, what speciﬁc
historical terms mean, taken as abstractions, then to decide
how far such meanings can be pushed, given the realities of
current language and politics. The justiﬁcation for judges
taking on this role is underdeveloped, but clearly rooted in
a Rawlsian understanding of the requirements of liberal
democracy (see especially the discussion of appropriate
goals at pp. 175–76 and of Rawls’s overlapping consensus
on p. 53, as well as Fleming’s bow to Rawls’s constructivism at p. 20).
In the end, Fleming’s progressive project adds little
more than a note of caution to old-fashioned living
constitutionalism. For all his insistence on his own ﬁdelity,
he sees the Constitution as little more than the commands
of ancestors whose sins render their work suspect, save as

a source of broad principles that judges can make conform
to progressive aspirations in support of progressive policies.
The ﬁdelity of such a model attaches to the political
program of its creator, not the Constitution, or even the
people in whose name the interpreter seeks to make law.
Response to Bruce Frohnen’s review of Fidelity to our
Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and
Against Originalisms
doi:10.1017/S1537592717003735

— James E. Fleming

Bruce Frohnen’s essay conﬁrms my analysis of the profound differences between our books. In this response, I
point out three ways he force-ﬁts my arguments into
a conservative script about “Progressives” and the viliﬁcation of the founding that is alien to my project.
First, Frohnen force-ﬁts my moral reading, with its
conception of ﬁdelity as honoring the aspirational principles embodied in the Constitution, into a conservative
script about progressive living constitutionalism as rejecting ﬁdelity to the Constitution. Progressive living constitutionalism disavows any aspiration to ﬁdelity—it is too
forward looking for that—as well as any aspiration to
a moral reading—it is too pragmatic to abide any
commitment to coherence and integrity in building out
the best understanding of our constitutional commitments
over time. Frohnen brushes these differences aside with the
conclusory assertion that “Fleming’s progressive project
adds little more than a note of caution to old-fashioned
living constitutionalism” (p. 5). With all due respect, my
moral reading is as different from “old-fashioned living
constitutionalism” as it is from old originalism!
Second, Frohnen strains to force-ﬁt my book into
a conservative script about progressives vilifying the
Founders. He recasts my reference to “racist, sexist, and
heterosexist expectations and presuppositions” that might
have been “reﬂected in the common law and statute books
in 1868” (p. 63) as a viliﬁcation of “text-based, original
meanings” of the Constitution itself (p. 3). And he
attributes to me, without any basis, a view that the
Founders’ “sins render their work suspect” (p. 5). Indeed,
Frohnen is so intent on force-ﬁtting my book into this
conservative script that he literally puts words in my
mouth. He writes: “Fleming argues that only a ‘Constitution-perfecting theory’. . . can save us from the status of
‘pygmies’ bowing down before fatally ﬂawed ancestors
(pp. 189, 191).” Yet contrary to Frohnen’s quotation
marks, nowhere on pages 189 or 191 do I use the word
“pygmies.” (To be sure, I quote Bruce Ackerman’s usage of
that term on pages 143, 148, 154, and 185 in summarizing his argument regarding the New Deal amending the
Constitution outside the formal amending procedures of
Article V, but I do not endorse Ackerman’s usage or his
March 2018 | Vol. 16/No. 1
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argument. Here again, Frohnen is force-ﬁtting my argument into his script about “Progressivism” that I do not
exemplify or accept.) Nor do I say that the Founders are
“fatally ﬂawed.” To the contrary, I argue that my moral
reading presents “a more ennobling view of the founders”
than do forms of originalism that attribute to them “an
interest in imposing their will on their posterity” (p. 191).
My argument is not that the Founders were sinful or fatally
ﬂawed but that they were wise, took the long view, and
established a Constitution that is a scheme of abstract
rights and powers to be built out over time on the basis of

188
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experience and reasoned judgments about the best understanding of our commitments.
Finally, Frohnen force-ﬁts my project—which begins
where we are today and seeks to construct the normative
theory that best ﬁts and justiﬁes our actual constitutional
practice—into a conservative narrative about a “radical
claim” to make the Constitution “conﬁrm to progressive
aspirations in support of progressive policies.” With
misreadings this pervasive, I can only ask the reader to
read my book and judge whether I make good on my
aspiration to ﬁdelity to our imperfect Constitution.
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